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In the short time since the late Pope John Paul II, now designated John Paul
the Great, delivered his controversial March, 2004 address on the morals of
providing, withholding, declining and discontinuing tube-feeding of persons in
the condition often called "persistent vegetative state," a number of cases
have arisen and interpretations offered of the papal statement, some of
them seriously affecting patient care. I I wish here to offer a reading of the
papal address that is more permissive than some in thelt)ptions it preserves
but, I think, faithful to the text and the wider tradition of Catholic moral
reasoning in medical ethics. Much of my discussion will focus on the more
general topic of assisted food and drink, rather than on the special issues
raised by the condition misleadingly called "persistent vegetative state."
I hasten to state that I am not a moral theologian, nor a theologian of
any sort. Rather, I wish to offer reasons why the recent statement might,
when construed within the larger context of Christian thought on ethical
issues in medical practice, reasonably be judged consistent with that
thought and with a position on responsible discretionary interventions with
such patients that I find sensible and attractive. My proposed interpretation
is offered as provisional, contingent on further exploration of these issues
in the light of religious and secular moral inquiry. Moreover, we need to be
sensitive to the fact that Pope John Paul II's March, 2004 allocution is part
of a tradition periodically developed and refined. Future doctrinal
statements may clarify the tradition's implications, rendering obsolete
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some of today's judgments about what Catholic medical ethics requires,
recommends, and permits.
I will proceed by first focusing on several key phrases in the papal
statement, indicating for each how it might reasonably be seen to cohere
with traditional Catholic ethical inquiry and moral common sense. In later
sections, I relate the recent allocution to a number of recent, chiefly secular
bioethical discussions of related issues, especially those of euthanasia and
care of the incompetent.

I. Some Key Passages
Certain passages in the papal text have engendered much
controversy and elicited criticism. We begin by examining some of them in
this section. In the next, I offer interpretations of these texts to clarify them
and suggest that many of the criticisms are misguided.
"The sick person in a vegetative state, awaiting recovery or a natural
end, still has a right to basic health care (nutrition, hydration, cleanliness,
warmth, etc .... and) the right to appropriate rehabilitative care ... "
"I should like particularly to underline how the administration of
water and food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents
a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act. Its use, furthermore,
should be considered in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such
morally obligatory, insofar as it seems to have attained its proper finality,
which in the present case consists in providing nourishment to the patient
and alleviation of his suffering.
"The evaluation of probabilities, founded on waning hopes for
recovery when the vegetative state is prolonged beyond a year, cannot
ethically justify the cessation or intelTuption of minimaf care for the
patient, including nutrition and hydration. Death by starvation or
dehydration is, in fact, the only possible outcome as a result of their
withdrawal. In this sense it ends up becoming, if done knowingly and
willingly, true and proper euthanasia by omission."
Significantly, the pope quotes from his own 1995 encyclical
Evangelium Vitae: "By euthanasia in the true and proper sense must be
understood an action or omission which by its very nature and intention
brings about death with the purpose of eliminating all pain."
"[N)o evaluation of costs can outweigh the value of the fundamental
good which we are trying to protect, that of human life. Moreover, to admit
that a decision regarding a man's life can be based on the external
acknowledgment of its quality, is the same as acknowledging that
increasing and decreasing levels of quality of life, and therefore of human
dignity, can be attributed from an external perspective to any subject, thus
introducing into social relations a discriminatory and eugenic principle."
May, 2006
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II. Some Interpretive Suggestions
John Paul II's talk was given to an audience at a meeting organized
by the Pontifical Academy for Life and the International Federation of
Catholic Medical Associations. This audience, he could assume, would be
familiar with Catholic training in medical ethics and would not need to
have all relevant exceptions and context spelled out for them. 2
A) John Paul II describes providing artificial nutrition and hydration
(hereafter, ANH) as both an "artificial means" and "a natural means of
preserving life" (para. 4). This is apt to cause confusion. I think the passage
is best read as indicating that ANH is an artificial way of doing a natural
thing, as would be using a cell phone to call for help when trapped in a
dangerous situation.
B) The papal statement maintains that ANH is "not a medical act"
(para. 4). Again, this is perplexing. It is, after all, a procedure performed by
medical personnel using medical equipment in a medical setting. Some
even prefer the term "medically assisted nutrition and hydration (MANH)"
to "rutificial nutrition and hydration," which I use here. 3 In what respect is
it, then , not a medical act?4 I suggest that the point is that providing
nutrition is not a healing, therapeutic or disease-preventive intervention. It
has much, and arguably more, in common with what is commonly
described as nursing care, such as keeping a patient clean and warm. My
colleague, the eminent theologian Lisa Sowle Cahill , compares ending
ANH to removing respirators , and certainly there are important
similarities. 5 Still, there are also differences that may rriatter. Breathing is
naturally an involuntary motion, what followers of Aquinas sometimes call
"an act of man" rather than a human action . In contrast, food and drink
always enter our bodies through some agent's voluntary action , usually
one's own. 6 That indicates an interesting and relevant way in which
receiving ANH is closer to the natural and ordinary means of getting food
and drink than is being on a respirator to natural and ordinary breathing.
The fact that, in ANH, the means and setting of supplying food and drink
are more technological does not suffice to make their provision narrowly
medicinal rather than nutJitive care.
Might it be cOlTectly said that inserting and maintaining the feeding
tube ru·e medical acts, even if the feeding and watering are not?7 Perhaps
so, though this claim seems to rely on a dubious ontology of human action,
according to which inserting and maintaining the tube that feeds the patient
are somehow different actions from that of feeding her. If the feeding is not
this, one wonders, what is it? In any case, I think the larger point is that
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little depends on this classificatory matter. Some people think it important
because they reason that, since the language of "ordinary means" and
"extraordinary means" comes from medical ethics, if ANH is not medical,
this distinction cannot apply to it, and thus no purchase is afforded the
claim that it may sometimes be morally optional because extraordinary.
This, however, is a non sequitur. If providing someone food and drink is
excessively burdensome to her or others, it is not morally obligatory,
regardless of whether the provision would be "a medical act" and whether
or not it fits some restricted technical definition of an "extraordinary
means."
C) What of the address's explicit claims that ANH "should be
considered in principle ordinary and proportionate and as such morally
obligatory" (para. 4)? Is withholding ANH or even discontinuing it, then,
never permitted? 8 That is not the only way to construe this claim, and I am
not convinced that it is the best. First, compare the ordinary statement:
What you borrow you ought in principle to return. Here, "in principle"
means such return is a duty normally considered in isolation and by itself
(and not in the sense in which medieval thinkers used the term in se), in the
abstract, in general. Adapting this use here could allow that ANH might still
become extraordinary and disproportionate in some circumstances, and be
licitly withheld or ended when it has. To be sure, the text admits of a
stricter reading, supporting a more stringent rule. My suggestion is that the
new statement on ANH and persistent vegetative state (hereafter, PVS) be
read as continuous with traditional Catholic thinking in health care ethics,
so that considerations of proportion are relevant and possibly dispositive,
so long as the action is not of a type that in virtue of its nature can never be
justified, is malum in se. 9 But should the recent papal sta(ement be read
precisely as branding withdrawal of (effective) ANH as malum in se?
Again, it admits of such a reading, but at this point and waiting further
clarification, I think that a looser reading plausible, available, and open.
A year after the papal allocution, the National Catholic Bioethics
Center in the USA announced its position that, "Food and water should be
provided for all patients who suffer PVS unless it fails to sustain life or
causes suffering," insisting that "(r)emoval of food and water is permissible
only when they no longer attain the ends for which they are provided." 10
However, it is not clear these two claims are themselves fully consistent.
What of the case where ANH is not futile but attains its end of prolonging
life, yet does so only by causing some burden so substantial as to be
disproportionate? PVS may rule out the patient's feeling pain, but this is
not the only form that a disprop0l1ionate burden may take. I I The US
Bishops' Conference has defined "disproportionate means" as measures
"that in the patient's judgment do not offer a reasonable hope of benefit or
May,2006
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entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive expense ... "12 Of course, a
PYS patient is in no position herself to judge "benefits" to be "reasonable"
or a "burden ... excessive." As Father Ford, of Australia's Chisholm Centre
for Healthcare Ethics, affirms, such patients "are unconscious, unaware of
themselves or their environment" and because "awake but not conscious,"
they are unable to show their wishes. 13 Nevertheless, it is not clear that
morally ending (or withholding) ANH requires that the patient must make
this judgment about, and at the time of, a proposed intervention. It may
sometimes be enough that the burdens of initiating or continuing ANH go
beyond some reasonable standard that the patient has endorsed previously
and in the abstract, especially in a carefully drafted and reflectively
informed advance directive. 14
How might her receiving ANH burden someone, specifically a PYS
patient and her loved ones? Even if pain and discomfort are not issues for
them, which can be questioned, and the expense is normally but not always
modest, the toll in infections and other physiological complications may
become so great that she could reasonably decline to continue despite the
lethal result. Certainly, the costs to caregivers in time, stress, and fatigue
can be so substantial it is morally permissible for them to decline further
provision even in the face of the patient's likely death.
Does all this evacuate the papal injunction of its point, perhaps even
content? Not at all. The point is that nourishing those unable to eat is
valuable and justified quite independently of their "quality of life" or
prospects for recovery. It should be the ordinary (here meaning typical,
normal) thing to do, in no need of further justification. This is a truth it is
important to assert in our time, when even some scholars in Christian
medical ethics are wont to reject, sometimes deriding it as "vitalism," the
claim .that anyone's life is valuable in a way that J,arrants protection
regardless of her disability, illness, etc. To the contrary, it is discontinuing
such care that will always require special justification. That is not to say,
however, that such justification can never be given, even when ANH
prolongs life, and I do not read the papal text as excluding that possibility
tout court. I retum to both these points below.
D) The 2004 address does allow that ANH might permissibly be
withdrawn when it cannot achieve its "proper finality" (para. 4). Here, as
the papal text makes clear, what is important is that the ends relevantly
appropriate to the provision of food and water are nourishment and
alleviating discomfort. Tubal delivery that cannot achieve this goal is futile
and, at best, optional.
To be sure, there are problems in the offing at this point. Some insist
that determinations of a form of treatment's futility themselves presuppose
judgments of a patient's quality of life. Others distinguish such "qualitative
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futility" from a more empirical "physiological futility." To be sure,
judgments that some type of care is futile are sometimes abused, used
merely to camouflage the view that someone's life is not worth saving.
Likewise, some determinations of futility do depend on evaluations of
evidence. And efforts to eliminate any room for subjective judgment or
assessment of evidence can have the effect of eliminating virtually any
legitimate scope for considerations of futlity.15 For all that, it seems to me
that a generally serviceable, attractive, reasonable, and objective account of
futility can be given. Often we can make do with an account that holds a
form of care for a type of illness to be futile when it has not achieved its
more immediate physiological goals to any appreciable extent in the last
hundred suitable patients within a region. 16
Eating and drinking usually bring someone many advantages besides
deliverance from hunger and thirst, of course, and they are often
undertaken with these results chiefly in mind - pleasures of the palate,
convivial enjoyment, a sense of one's welfare being furthered, the
interpersonal bonding that can be both manifested and cemented by
sharing goods. The point is that the "proper finality" of eating is achieved
in nourishment in the sense that this is its chief function, telos, point in
naturelbiology, though not necessarily the eating agent's foremost aim,
motivating thought, or conscious and adopted personal objective. ANH that
doesn't nourish and hydrate is futile treatment in the relevant sense, the
one, as we saw, sometimes called physiologically futile.
E) The pope stresses that "evaluation of probabilities ... cannot
ethically justify the cessation or interruption of minimal care for the
patient, including (even artificial) nutrition and hydration" (para. 5). Must
ANH, therefore, be started and maintained no matter what si'c!e effects are
likely? I do not think the statement should be interpreted that narrOWly. It is
saying that evaluation of the probability of the patient's recovery is not
necessary in order to make a determination of the medical and moral
necessity of ANH. That is because such contingency would improperly
suggest that the value of the patient's life hinges on its "quality",
specifically, on the likelihood of her substantially recovering. That is false.
The patient's life is valuable, just as graced with dignity as yours or mine,
irrespective of her health. Nevertheless, the likelihood of both the nutritive
effectiveness of ANH and of various untoward side-effects remains morally
always relevant, and they should be continually monitored and assessed. I
see nothing in the address that gainsays that.
F) What of the text's excluding the possibility that our "evaluation of
costs can outweigh the value of' human life, explicitly ruling out appeal to
any "external acknowledgment of its quality . . . as acknowledging that
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increasing and decreasing levels of quality of life can be attributed from an
external perspective to any subject," which latter step is described as
"introducing into social relations a discriminatory and eugenic principle?"
(para. 5,6) There are several important and valid points made here. First,
the sick and disabled have a serious (even equal) claim on our help.
Second, only the person herself can determine at what point the burden of
a form of intervention (whether or not it properly counts as a medical
treatment) is too much for her. Presumably, a duly designated sunogate can
try to detenrune and apply the patient's wishes, but none of us, separately
or collectively, may substitute our judgment on what sort of life is worth
living or saving.
That is not to say, of course, that the subject's own judgment is
infallible, nor that it should always be the conclusive consideration. The
papal statement is careful to indicate an asymmetry here. No one but the
patient herself may properly terminate ANH on the grounds that its
burdens to the patient (pain, discomfort, expense, intrusiveness,
restrictions, inconvenience to and deprivation of others, especially loved
ones) have become disproportionate to its benefits to her (continued life).
However, that does not mean that the patient must have the last word, no
matter what it is. On the contrary, the pope does not rule out our relying on
our own best judgment, rather than the patient's, when we think that
ANH's benefits to her outweigh its burdens. This may seem unfair, and the
thoughtless will complain that it is "cruel." However, it is not unfair, it is
just asymmetrical, and the implicit guideline is that we need to take care to
en, if sometimes we must, always on the side of life. It matters crucially
why (the reasons for which) the medical team withdraws care and, in the
case of the patient herself, it matters crucially why she asks that it be
withdrawn. 17 As Kant, the father of modern autonomy,' affirmed, not every
preference is to be honored but only those wherein the agent acts free from
pathological preferences and out of respect for her own and others'
inherent dignity as persons. 18 The patient whose choice to end ANH or
other care is a choice for death over life ought not to be abetted in this
decision. In fact, this sort of death-wish, and its accompanying act of selfdegradation, is one of the few places where the misused notion of "death
without dignity" might find legitimate application. Privileging life over
autonomy, as the pope here does, may displease some, but it is not an
unreasonable prioritization. It is just the opposite, in fact, and plainly has
nothing whatever of the character of genuine cruelty.

III. Withholding ANH in the Context of Euthanasia
We should now consider the papal claim that withdrawing ANH,
thereby condemning the patient to "death by starvation or dehydration . .. as
138
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the only possible outcome ... ends up becoming, if done knowingly and
willingly, true and proper euthanasia by omission." (para.4) This is quite
strongly worded. What is he saying here? Recall that John Paul II is careful
in this address to quote from an earlier document where he sought to define
euthanasia. There, he wrote that: "by euthanasia in the true and proper
sense must be understood an action or omission which by its very nature
and intention brings about death with the purpose of eliminating all pain ."
(Evangelium Vitae, para. 65)
This makes it clear that, as this pope understands the term, intention
is a necessary condition for euthanasia, along with result. Of course,
intentions should neither be restricted nor imputed artificially or in a
contrived way. We also need to remember that means count crucially. We
will often need to ask, how does an agent reasonably mean/plan (i.e., have
it in mind) to get from her course of conduct C to her envisioned resultant
state S1 if not through the intermediary (means) step of result S2? As
indicated in this account, it constitutes euthanasia, morally and in fact,
when an agent's relevant course of conduct is self-restraining - that is,
omissive - but nevertheless routed to its planned, targeted resultant state
through the intermediary step of the patient's death. Again, it matters
crucially why (the reasons for which) she withdraws care. And, in cases
where the patient can voice her wishes, it matters crucially the reasons for
which she asks that it be withdrawn. Those in PYS are, of course, unable at
the time of care to voice, or even have, such preferences. However, they are
not the only such patients, and it can be instructive for us to widen our
scope and consider what people are saying about withdrawing lifesustaining treatment from, and even actively putting to death, neonates and
other infants - especially those with severe mental deficiencies.
Stephen Pinker, the prolific proponent and popularizer 'of so-called
evolutionary psychology, wrote a controversial New York Times essay
where he claimed, "It seems obvious that we need a clear boundary to
confer personhood on a human being and grant it a right to life. Otherwise,
we approach a slippery slope that ends in the disposal of inconvenient
people ... (To recognize a right to life in all but only) members of our own
species, Homo sapiens, ... is simply chauvinism; a person of one race could
just as easily say that people of another race have no right to life. No, the
right to life must come, the moral philosophers say, from morally
significant traits that we humans happen to possess ... having a unique
sequence of experiences that defines us as individuals and connects us to
other people, . .. an ability to reflect upon ourselves as a continuous locus of
consciousness, to form and savor plans for the future, to dread death and to
express the choice not to die. And there's the rub: our immature (human)
neonates don't possess these traits any more than mice dO."19
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I think Pinker's implicit comparison of the differences between
White and Black people to those between the human and the subhuman
racially offensive. Moreover, we do not "confer personhood on" people,
nor "grant it" a moral right - note the term " it" - but rather recognize
(acknowledge) their personhood and appreciate the rights that it grounds.
Pinker notes that very few mothers who kill their one-day-old children
(what he calls "neonaticide" as distinct from other "filicide", that is, the
killing of offspring) are tried, convicted, and imprisoned. He infers from
this that we empathize with the very young victims. (He cites a study
indicating that of 300 women charged with such crimes in the USA and
Britain, none spent more than one night in jail.) Pinker explains this
differential concern by speculating that evolution has equipped us to feel a
certain detachment until the child shows himself or herself capable of
survival and thus a good investment of time and attention. However, Pinker
himself notes that these baby-killers are usually very young, unmaJTied,
alone, poor, and desperate. That suggests a different explanation for
society's clemency: it may be rooted more in our greater sympathy for the
killers than in our lesser sympathy for their victims. Finally, it is true
neither that we "happen" to possess personal attributes nor that only those
who in fact possess them, or possess them at a certain time of their lives,
are persons. Rather, these qualities are most plausibly seen as defining
personhood in that a human person is a being that by its natural inclination
properly and naturally tends to develop them. When a human being is not
yet at the stage where they have developed, or is at the appropriate stage
but is such that some internal or external misfortunes have thwarted their
development (or ended them) these facts do not deprive her of personhood,
causally or conceptually. In fact, it only compounds her mischance, and
literally adds insult to injury, if we take this disability 1s grounds further to
deprive her even of social protections and personal respect.
Barbara Smoker, former president of Britain's National Secular
Society, writes in a publication of the Council for Democratic and Secular
Humanism, "I strongly feel that it is cruel, and therefore immoral, to
preserve a baby 's life when there are such severe handicaps that chances of
happiness are manifestly low. For life can, of course, be far worse than
death ... (Acting) to starve seriously defective neonates to death - giving
them only water, not milk ... is certainly better than keeping them alive but not as merciful as a quick, lethal injection ... Since we now have a
social duty to limit our families, it is only sensible to limit them to those
with a reasonable prospect of a normal human life . .. A newborn baby has
very limited awareness, no idea of any future, and no real stake in life,
(whereas, in contrast,) an older child has become a real little person, with
personal relationships, a sense of his or her own identity, and an idea of
purpose - the very things that give human beings human rights and status.20
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What we need to remember, in the face of Smoker's remarks, is that
the principal way in which human life is valuable is rooted in the status and
dignity of human personhood and does not derive from its usefulness for
achieving happiness, having an idea of the future, and so on. Newborn
babies are already and intrinsically persons, albeit little ones, and that
status does not depend on what level of development they have achieved or
will later achieve. H. Lagercrantz opines that "it is wrong to ask if
euthanasia of infants should be legal. It is better to retain respect for a
personal life defined as a human individual with consciousness or the
potential to become conscious. Having set his definition like this, he feels
entitled to say, with regard to deliberately withholding resuscitation and
treatment from certain severely encephalopathological children "with a
very limited ability to develop a reasonable level of consciousness," that he
"do(es) not regard this as euthanasia because the infant is not a conscious,
or potentially conscious, person."21
Garret Keizer, an essayist who sometimes writes for the leftist
American political magazine The Nation, believes he has uncovered what
really motivates those who wish to protect life and medicine from the
professional deformity that he and others call physician-assisted suicide.
"The light talks about protecting life and tradition, but on some level. .. it is
mostly interested in protecting pain. The first is theological: the belief that
pain holds the meaning of life ... The second reason ... is political: the
belief that pain is fundamental to justice."22
Keizer offers little reason for imputing this odd idea to his
adversaries, and it seems like mere unfairness. To be sure, many religious
people remind us that suffering is not an unalloyed ill and even biology
shows its normal usefulness. They also know that deserved suffering is a
necessary part of criminal justice, though most religious peoPle in the West
are content these days to restrict the desirable types of suffering to the
frustrations and restrictions of fines, incarceration and, at most, relatively
painless execution. More to the point, one would certainly have difficulty
locating a reputable religious ethicist who thinks that medicine has a
legitimate role in increasing, maximizing, prolonging, or enabling patients'
pain. So, Keizer's claim is merely mean-spirited fancy.
Against what he imagines to be his adversaries ' fixation on
"protecting pain," Keizer wants to make his stand with liberal democracy.
"PAS (physician-assisted suicide) rests on two principles that are central to
a liberal society. The first is that we are owners of our own lives ... The
second principle ... is that we are collective owners of the culture we
produce collectively. The debate over PAS is ... about who owns the
medicine .. . And one thing more about the relevance of a Death with
Dignity law to our democracy: we are free to try it OUt."23
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Keizer's odd, left-libertarian view is rife with bad metaphors of
ownership: owning our selves, owning medicine. It is unseemly for anyone
to make so much depend on economic analogies, particularly someone on
the Left. In any case, there is little substance to his reasoning, since it is
difficult to make sense of his idea of owning ourselves - if this entitles us to
kill ourselves, does it not also entitle us to sell ourselves, even to give
ourselves away to others in permanent bondage? But what sense can be
made of self-alienation? And how could it be a matter of right? I cannot
only destroy, sell, or give away my couch legally, I can also rip it up when I
feel like it. And I can do any of these merely according to my passing
captice in the eyes of the law. Does Keizer's defense of PAS also bravely
guarantee our moral tight to deface, even mutilate ourselves simply on the
basis of a passing fancy? And should this entitlement also be legally
encoded? If not, how and on what basis are these moral lines to be drawn?
What sort of liberalism is it that could so casually commit itself to
whimsical enslavement and mutilation? While John Locke spins in his
grave, we would do well to remember this fact: those patients who exercise
their Keizer-granted right to "try ... out" PAS can never learn from their
experiment's failure. It is doubtful that this is what Mill had in mind in
talking of the marketplace of ideas.
Keizer also notices that many disabled people, and those who love
them, are starting to notice the implications of condoning infanticide and
mercy-killing for people who can no longer take care of themselves,
ambulate, and so on. Some do not like those implications, and are
becoming more vocal in expressing their misgivings. "Groups like Not
Dead Yet," he observes, "view any laws for assisted death as a threat to the
very existence of the disabled. At least they claim to. After reading some of
their literature, I suspect that what they see is not as 'Inuch a threat as an
insult. 'Death with Dignity' becomes a loaded term in the presence of Life
with Disability. Complaints about the 'indignities' ofterminal illness -loss
of control over bathroom functions, complete lack of mobility - are
naturally going to seem offensive to those who have struggled to assert
their dignity under similar conditions."24 Of course, the insult to the
disabled in this nasty rhetoric is not merely perceived; it is inherent in
much talk of "death with dignity."
John Robertson, an expert in issues of biomedical law, strains to
justify his strange view that parents ought to be legally empowered to make
care decisions because of what appears to constitute a plain conflict of
interest. "Because parents (and other children) will bear the burdens of
caring for the child with severe impairments, they should have the right to
refuse resuscitation or treatment in ... (severe) cases."25 He continues, "If
one lacks altogether the capacity for meaningful symbolic interaction, then
one lacks the charactetistics that make humans the object of moral duties ...
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(T)he mental disability in such cases is so extreme, so far from those cases
in which children may be said to have valid interests in living, that they
arguably do not threaten to harm the important values underlying the
injunction against quality of life assessments in cases of disability."26
However, we should reject Robertson's claim that disabled babies
lack relationship. Rather they already are related to us as somebody's son
or daughter, grandchild, brother, sister, nephew, niece, etc. The question is
how we respond to them -living up to (or failing in) these relationships.
The same holds true for PVS patients.
This shift from concern to avoid burden on patients (especially, their
pain), to avoiding burden on parents (who Robertson, oddly, wants to
empower to make decisions precisely because of their conflict of interest),
shows that not all the impetus for infanticide is really mercy-killing, killing
from (supposed) mercy for the patient. It also raises the question: which
putative justification will come next? Avoiding burden to society? People
who point out that the last century's chief advocates of euthanasia were in
the Third Reich are nowadays denounced in high dudgeon. We have
become accustomed to hearing that things are entirely different now,
because the Reich supported euthanasia for the supposed good of society
while the current trend appeals to individual autonomy and dignity. But as
the rationale for infanticide shifts from avoiding the patient's pain to
respecting her wishes, and now to enabling her potential caregivers to spare
themselves expense and trouble, just how far are we from the Nazis'
rationale for euthanasia?
Finally, consider Eduard Verhagen. Dr. Verhagen is clinical director
of the Pediatric Clinic in the University Hospital of Groningen, a Dutch
hospital whose physicians have a policy of sometime perfonning mercy
killings on terminally ill newborns. In a recent NPR interView about his
clinics' activities, he said, "(W)e felt that in these children the most
humane course of action would be to allow the child to die, and even
actively assist them in their death . .. (F)rom a medical point of view, it is
very important to be strict on the protection of life. And in extreme cases,
the best way to protect life is to sometimes assist a little bit in death."27
I will not belabor the nasty absurdities of human infanticide and
protecting life (whose? from what? one wonders) by helping "a little bit in
death." One important lesson from reflecting on the disgraceful statements
I have discussed, and it would be easy to multiply such examples, is that
we all need to learn to accept and value our common dependence, and
recognize that there is no indignity in it, while it is manifestly degrading to
judge some people to have lives worth neither saving nor living.28
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IV. Withholding ANH: Intervention and Its Discontents
Bearing those truths in mind can help us act more responsibly in
making decisions about starting and discontinuing ANH. These decisions
can get especially complicated with patients in PVS. We need to
remember, for example, that diagnosis of PVS can be quite unreliable. Dr.
Allen Counter reports that a 32-year-old woman whose doctors concluded
that she, while "unresponsive to sensory stimuli, devoid of any intellectual
function , and in a persistent vegetative state," consistently turned towards a
music box playing in her room, and "began to smile and make sounds, as if
she were enjoying" it. 29 He reports that he found himself "emotionally
moved by her struggle for human definition through the single modality of
hearing," that her doctors began responding to her more personally ("in
some cases, holding her hand and trying to speak with her"), and that she
continued to enjoy the music for some years . He concludes that "Her case
was a reminder of how much we do not understand about the brain, and
that even people in an apparent vegetative state may have ways of
connecting to the world around them. "30
For all that, there can be reasons to withhold or discontinue ANH that
are neither rooted in nor routed through the euthanasist's aim of
"eliminating all (the patient's) pain" through her death. Dr. Muriel Gillick
holds that feeding and watering by tube are "seldom warranted for patients
in the final stage of dementia," because they have "few if any benefits and
there is considerable potential for harm."3l She bases this conclusion on
evidence that ANH has not been shown to lead to longer lives as compared
with those who do not receive it, can cause diarrhea and nausea (so that
neither nutrition nor hydration really results), and often leads to infections.
In addition , demented patients frequently behave so as t~ pull out the tubes
and need to be restrained, causing distress, fear, and diminished
autonomy.32 Moreover, ANH provides neither the felt satisfaction of eating
nor the social interaction of being spoon-fed. Gillick's views have been
controverted and I certainly possess neither the knowledge nor the
expertise to make a judgment. 33 My point is that the factors she cites are
relevant, not excluded as such. Indeed, even the magnitude of financial
costs to the patient and her family can be relevant, though this would be
less true in a more just system of health care allocation. 34
The US Catholic Bishops have stated that, while "there should be a
presumption in favor of providing nutrition and hydration to all patients,
including patients who require medically assisted nutrition and hydration,"
such intervention is morally required only when it "is of sufficient benefit
to outweigh the burdens involved (by its provision) to the patient."35
Indeed, the burdens to others, e.g., relatives, can also be legitimately be
considered. Robert Orr reminds us that "For. .. years, traditional moral
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theology distinguished between ordinary and extraordinary means of
saving life. Ordinary means were those that were not too painful or
burdensome for the patient, were not too expensive, and had a reasonable
chance of working."36 Other measures involving "undue burden(,) were
extraordinary and thus · optional." The distinguished Protestant ethicist
Gilbert Meilander rightly affirms that "we may refuse treatments that are
either useless or excessively burdensome. In doing so, we choose not death
but one among several lives open to us." His point is that sometimes, in
withholding or discontinuing ANH, we act licitly because all that "we aim
to dispense with (is) the treatment, not the life." In contrast, "if! decide not
to treat because I think a person's life is useless, then I am taking aim not at
the treatment but at the life." In this context, it is worth noting Father Ford's
claim that "to prolong indefinitely the life of a patient in a permanent
unconscious state does not seem to respect (her life's inherent) W0l1h" and
his alarming suggestion, cast as a question, that "subject(ing someone) to
years of unconscious life sustained by MANH (medically assisted nutrition
and hydration)" shows a "lack of respect for (that) patient's inherent
dignity."37 I find it difficult to interpret this statement in a way that does not
imply that it is such a life itself that is being targeted for termination
because somehow unworthy, rather than the treatment that is being
terminated despite and not because of the fact that doing so shortens the
patient's life.
Even the idea of accepting some undesirable side effects of actions
taken for good ends is complicated. We should not take too literally the
metaphor of "weighing," Meilander sagely observes. "On what scale one
'weighs' benefits and burdens is a question almost impossible to answer.
Even more doubtful is whether we can 'weigh' them for someone else. My
own view is that when we make these decisions for oursel~es, we are not
weighing anything. We are deciding what sort of person we will be and
what sort of life will be ours. We are making not a discovery but a
decision." He cautions against being "too quick to assume that feeding
tubes are 'treatment' rather than standard nursing care ... It is hard to see
why such services as turning a patient regularly and giving alcohol rubs are
standard nursing care while feeding is not. "38 Meilander's trenchant
discussion reminds us of our moral tradition 's familiar insight that, as
Father Ford nicely summarizes it, "Human life is a gift of God; it is a basic
good of the person and not merely a means to other goods."

v. Conclusion
I have here tried to offer an interpretation and partial defense of the
recent papal statement on ANH and PVS , placing this form of care and this
condition in the larger contexts of recent discussion of care option, and
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euthanasia for other persons who have diminished or unrealized capacities,
especially newborns. Mine can be seen as a kind of middle view between
those who deem the lives of some unworthy of prolongation on the one
hand and, on the other hand, an unconditional requirement to administer
food and water artificially, provided only that it nourishes and hydrates, no
matter how much doing so burdens the patient and her family and others.
That is not to say I find the two alternatives equal. The more restrictive is a
plausible, serious position, clearly consistent with responsible Christian
thinking in medical ethics. In contrast, those who deem disabled lives
unworthy of saving are spokespersons for what John Paul II repeatedly and
trenchantly labeled an "anti-life culture" or, more starkly an "anticulture."39
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